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Abstract
We experimentally investigate the e¤ect of endowment allocation procedures on
social preferences using a two-stage dictator game. In the rst stage, participants who
were randomly selected as allocators had to perform a task in order to earn money.
Better performance on the task resulted in higher earnings. In our baseline merito-
cratic treatment, the allocatorsinitial endowment was set equal to their individual
earnings. We compared this with an egalitarian treatment whereby the allocators
initial endowment was set equal to the average earnings of all allocators. Essentially,
high performers were taxed and underperformers were subsidized by the high per-
formers. In the second stage, the allocators had to divide their endowment with the
recipients. We show that the allocators were more generous in the egalitarian treat-
ment than in the meritocratic treatment. Interestingly, being taxed did not reduce
the high performersgenerosity but being subsidized did signicantly increase the un-
derperformersgenerosity. Thus, being treated kindly induced the underperformers
to reciprocate forward to other people.
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1 Introduction
Countless experimental studies have established that human beings exhibit other regard-
ing behavior. That is, they do not only care about their own material payo¤s, but also
about fairness, reciprocity, and other peoples well being. When they are asked to allocate
their money endowment to an unknown recipient in a dictator game setting, instead of
giving nothing, they typically allocate about 15%-20% (Camerer 2003).
Some explanations for this other regarding behavior have been suggested in the liter-
ature. Rabin (1993) points to the importance of the direct reciprocity motive. A persons
behavior toward another person is driven by the (expected) intention of the other person
toward the former. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as well as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) ar-
gue that other regarding behavior is primarily driven by the nal distribution of payo¤s
among people in the reference group. All of these studies share one common thread. That
is, they focus solely on factors that are directly related to allocation decisions such as the
motives and consequences behind those allocation decisions, but not on other factors that
are seemingly unrelated to, but could possibly inuence, those allocation decisions such as
the procedure by which people earn their initial money endowment. The existing theories
and experimental results are silent in this respect. They disregard the possible link be-
tween the procedure by which the money endowment is generated and distributed among
individuals, and the allocation decisions of these individuals.
The following scenario further illustrates the above point. Consider two distinct in-
stitutional environments. The rst one is an environment characterized by a meritocratic
system in which people are compensated on the basis of their individual performance,
while the second one is an environment characterized by an egalitarian distribution sys-
tem in which everybody receives an equal compensation. Thus, essentially, in the second
environment the high performers are taxed and the underperformers are subsidized to
maintain an equal compensation across people. The former environment resembles a pure
capitalist system with no taxation, while the latter resembles a socialist system with egal-
itarian income redistribution. It would be interesting to nd out whether or not peoples
giving behavior toward others is di¤erent in these two institutional environments. If the
answer is yes, in which institutional environment would people exhibit stronger other re-
garding behavior? Would there be any di¤erence in generosity between people who are
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taxedand people who are subsidizedin an egalitarian environment?
We conducted an experimental investigation on this very issue in a laboratory setting
using a modied dictator game. In our experiment, the participants were randomly
divided into two groups and were assigned di¤erent roles. In one group, the participants
were assigned the role of an allocator, while in the other group, the participants were
assigned the role of a recipient. Prior to playing the allocation game, the allocators
had to participate in a production stage, in which they had to answer a set of GRE-
and GMAT-like questions. They were then given information on their individual scores
obtained from the production stage, their individual ranking of scores among all allocators,
and the general distribution of scores. Subsequently, they were given information on how
their scores were going to be translated into their initial money endowment.
We conducted two experimental treatments. In one treatment, which we label the
meritocratic treatment, the allocators were told that they would receive an initial money
endowment, the amount of which depended on their individual performance in the pro-
duction stage. In the other treatment, which we label the egalitarian treatment, the
allocators were told that they would receive an initial money endowment, the amount of
which would be equal for everybody. Essentially, in the latter, each allocator receives the
average money endowment. The high performers would be taxed and the underperform-
ers would be subsidized. Subsequently, in the allocation game, the allocators were asked
to transfer part of their money endowment to an anonymous recipient. We compare the
amount of transfer made by the allocators in these two treatments.
Two things about our experimental design are worth stressing. Firstly, unlike in most
of the existing dictator game experiments, the initial money endowment in our experiment
has to be earned by the allocators in the production stage instead of being exogenously
given to them.1 Secondly, from the production stage we are able to rank the allocators on
the basis of their individual performance; that is, their scores. In general, the distribution
of their scores follows a bell-shaped curve. We convey this piece of information to the
allocators. Under a meritocratic setting, higher scores are translated into a higher initial
money endowment. However, under an egalitarian setting, the high performing allocators
1See also Konow (2000), Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002), Cappelen et al. (2007), List (2007),
and List and Cherry (2007) for other dictator game experiments that require participants to earn the
initial money endowment.
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would receive a lower initial money endowment than under a meritocratic setting, while
the underperforming allocators would receive a higher initial money endowment than
under a meritocratic setting.
This paper shows that the allocators were more generous under the egalitarian regime
than under the meritocratic regime. Thus, an egalitarian regime gave rise to stronger
other regarding behavior. Interestingly, and rather surprisingly, being taxed did not
reduce the high performersgenerosity. However, being subsidized by the high performers
did signicantly increase the underperformersgenerosity, suggesting that being treated
kindly by the system encouraged them to pay (reciprocate) it forward to other people.
In essence, an egalitarian system breeds generosity. Boulding (1981) formally coined the
term serial reciprocity to refer to this kind of generous attitude.
"A very interesting aspect of reciprocity is what might be called serial reci-
procity in which gift from A to B creates a generalized sense of obligation on
the part of B. This obligation is satised by a gift from B not to A but to
another party C, who in turn satised his sense of obligation to another party
D, and so on ... (Boulding (1973), pp. 31-32)."
Another denition of serial reciprocity is given by Moody (2008), who argued that,
"Serial reciprocity exists when people reciprocate for what they have received,
for example, from a parent, a friend, a mentor, a stranger, a previous gener-
ation, by providing something to a third party, regardless of whether a return
is also given to, or makes its way back to, the original giver (Moody (2008),
p. 1)."
The above results also showed that the procedure by which the initial money endow-
ment is generated and distributed signicantly inuenced the extent of peoples other
regarding behavior. At a more general level, our experimental results demonstrated that
social preferences are also shaped by the surrounding institutional environment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our experimental design and
procedures. Section 3 presents our experimental results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
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2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The participants in our experiment were undergraduate students at the National Uni-
versity of Singapore. They came from various academic backgrounds, such as business,
science, engineering, and arts and social sciences. The experiment was conducted via the
www interface at the computer lab located in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of
the university.
In all treatments, we implemented similar procedures to those carried out in Forsythe
et al. (1994).2 Participants were randomly assigned to two groups and placed in two
separate rooms (room A and room B). The two groups did not have any contact before,
during, or after the experiment. We then carried out a random draw to determine the role
of the participants in the two separate rooms. From this draw, the participants in room
A were assigned the role of allocators and those in room B the role of recipients. The
allocators were aware that there were other participants in room B who acted as their
recipients. Next, they were given unique, randomly generated numerical user IDs to act
as personal identiers throughout the experiment. Experimental instructions were read
out loud in front of them. Communication among participants was strictly forbidden.
They were requested to raise their hands if they had questions, and we attended to those
questions in private. No participants participated in more than one treatment.
The experiment consisted of two stages, namely, the production stage and the al-
location stage. In the production stage, allocators earned their money endowment by
completing a quiz consisting of 20 GRE- and GMAT-like questions within 15 minutes. Of
these 20 questions, 8 covered verbal English, 8 were mathematical, and 4 were analytical.3
A correct answer resulted in a one-point addition to their total scores, whereas an incor-
rect answer resulted in a one-point deduction. If a question was left unanswered, a point
was neither added nor deducted. Point deductions were intended to curb the participants
incentive to guess randomly when they did not know the correct answer to a question.
The scores were then translated into their money equivalent using a conversion rate of
one point being equal to S$1:00. Each participant also received S$3:00 as a show-up
2Experimental instructions, computer screen-shots, and the complete experimental data are available
upon request.
3All participants received the same set of questions, but the sequence of questions di¤ered across
participants. When the time allotted was over, participantsanswers would be automatically submitted
by the system to the central administration site.
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fee. Note that those participants who were selected as recipients were not involved in the
production stage. Their money income before the transfer received from the allocators
was therefore equal to the S$3:00 show-up fee.
The scores were shown on the allocatorscomputer screens immediately after all an-
swer to the questions had been submitted. When the allotted time for answering the
questions was over and the allocators still had not completely answered all the questions,
the computer system would lock the screen and assign zero points for the unanswered
questions. In addition to their individual scores, they were given information on their
individual ranking of scores among all allocators and the general distribution of scores.
We conducted two experimental treatments, namely the meritocratic treatment and
the egalitarian treatment. In the former, prior to the allocation stage, we told the alloca-
tors that their initial money endowment would be equal to the money equivalent of their
individual scores plus a S$3:00 show-up fee. In the latter, prior to the allocation stage,
we told the allocators that their initial money endowment would be equal to the money
equivalent of the average allocatorsscores plus a S$3:00 show-up fee. Essentially, in the
latter treatment, the high performing allocators were taxed, while the underperforming
allocators were subsidized.
In the allocation stage, allocators were asked to transfer part of their money endow-
ment to an anonymous recipient located in room B. The allowed amount of transfer
ranged from zero up to their total money endowment, though no decimal (cents) alloca-
tion amount was allowed. The remaining amount of money net of the transfer made went
to the allocators. We compared the amount of transfer made by both the high and low
scoring allocators in the two experimental treatments we conducted. We considered the
meritocratic treatment as our baseline treatment.
At the end of the allocation stage, we prepared the payments to the allocators, inserted
them in sealed envelopes marked with their uniquely generated user IDs, and then left
them in a designated place for the allocators to collect. We also prepared the payments
to the recipients according to the allocation decisions made by the allocators, inserted
them in sealed envelopes, and took them to the recipients room, where they were left
in a designated place for the recipients to collect. Including the time spent handling
the registration process and preparing the payments to the participants, our experiment
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lasted for about 50 minutes.
3 Experimental Results
The following table summarizes the descriptive statistics of our experiment.
[ENTER TABLE 1 HERE]
In each experimental treatment, there were 36 allocators and 36 recipients. The gender
composition of allocators across treatments was the same: there were 20 female and 16
male allocators in each treatment.
The mean scores for both treatments are reasonably equal. On average, allocators
answered about 10 questions correctly in both treatments. However, the distribution of
scores in the egalitarian treatment has a slightly larger variation than the one in the
meritocratic treatment. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Figure 1, both distributions
have a similar shape.
[ENTER FIGURE 1 HERE]
We run the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to check whether both distributions
are statistically identical. The null hypothesis states that the two distributions are statis-
tically identical. Table 2 shows that the p-value from the test is 0.6150, implying that the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In addition, we run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
to check whether the means of the two distribution functions are statistically identical.
The p-value obtained from the test is 0.9774, indicating that they are not statistically
di¤erent. This also implies that our experimental design does well in controlling for the
possible impact of the treatments on the allocatorsperformance. This is important as
we just want to focus our analysis on the impact of the treatments on the allocators
giving behavior without having to worry about the possible impact of treatments on the
allocatorsperformance.
[ENTER TABLE 2 HERE]
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Figure 2 illustrates the distributions of the allocatorscontribution as a proportion
of their initial money endowment in the meritocratic and egalitarian treatments. The
front row histogram is for the meritocratic treatment, while the back row histogram is
for the egalitarian treatment. The vertical axis depicts the number of allocators whose
contribution rate falls within a certain range. The horizontal axis depicts the range of
contribution rate. From a casual observation of the gure, it is apparent that the allocators
in the egalitarian treatment have a tendency to give a higher contribution rate than the
allocators in the meritocratic treatment.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Next, we further classify the allocators into low scoring and high scoring allocators.
The former are those allocators whose scores were below the median scores, and the latter
are those allocators whose scores were above the median scores. Table 3 below presents the
information on the mean, median, and standard deviation of the contribution rates of all
allocators, the high scoring allocators, and the low scoring allocators in both treatments.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The average contribution rate in the meritocratic treatment is around 8.6%, while the
average contribution rate in the egalitarian treatment is around 15.4%, suggesting indeed
that the allocators were more generous under the egalitarian treatment than under the
meritocratic treatment. The average contribution rate of the high scoring allocators in
the meritocratic treatment is around 8.1%. In the egalitarian treatment, the average
contribution rate is about 11.1%. These two numbers do not di¤er much. However, the
average contribution of the low scoring allocators in the egalitarian treatment is about
10% larger than the average contribution of the low scoring allocators in the meritocratic
treatment, suggesting that the egalitarian treatment induces the low scoring allocators to
be more generous.
Figure 3 below illustrates the distribution of the contribution rates of the allocators
in the two treatments.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
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A casual inspection of the above gure indeed reveals that, rstly, in the meritocratic
treatment there seems to be no big di¤erence in terms of the contribution rate between
the high and low scoring allocators, as is apparent from the comparison between the rst
and second row histograms in Figure 3. This, however, does not seem to be the case in the
egalitarian treatment. As can be seen from the comparison between the third and fourth
row histograms in Figure 3, the low scoring allocators appeared to be more generous than
the high scoring allocators in the egalitarian treatment.
Secondly, the high scoring allocators did not seem to reduce their contribution rate
in the egalitarian treatment despite being taxed. This can be seen from a comparison
between the second and fourth row histograms in Figure 2.
Thirdly, there are fewer allocators who contributed between 0% and 5% of their en-
dowment in the egalitarian treatment than in the meritocratic treatment. This suggests
that the allocators have a tendency to be more generous in the egalitarian treatment than
in the meritocratic treatment.
Next, we run statistical tests to formally verify the above casual observations. The
results are presented in Table 4 below. The table gives the p-values obtained from the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the equality of means. The results indeed conrm our
casual observation. The average contribution rate of all allocators in the egalitarian
treatment is signicantly higher than the average contribution rate of all allocators in the
meritocratic treatment. Likewise, the average contribution rate of the low scoring allo-
cators in the egalitarian treatment is signicantly higher than the average contribution
rate of the low scoring allocators in the meritocratic treatment. However, the average
contribution rate of the high scoring allocators in the egalitarian treatment is not statis-
tically di¤erent from the average contribution rate of the high scoring allocators in the
meritocratic treatment.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Table 5 shows a series of OLS regressions with the contribution rate as the dependent
variable. The independent variables include earnings, the gender dummy that is equal to
1 if male and 0 if female, the treatment dummy that is equal to 1 for the meritocratic
treatment and 0 for the egalitarian treatment, and the interactive variable between the
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treatment dummy and gender.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
The regression results show that the coe¢ cients for the treatment dummy are negative
and statistically signicant either at the 5% or 10% signicance levels, implying that
indeed the meritocratic treatment results in a lower contribution rate than the egalitarian
treatment. The independent variable earnings is not signicant; however, the sign of its
coe¢ cients is negative, suggesting that the contribution rate decreases with earnings.
We also run another series of OLS regressions with the absolute amount of contribution
as the dependent variable instead of the contribution rate. The regression results are given
in Table 6. It can be seen that the coe¢ cients for the treatment dummy are negative
and all of them are signicant at the 5% signicance level, implying that the meritocratic
treatment leads to a lower absolute contribution. Interestingly, the coe¢ cients for the
independent variable earnings, although not statistically signicant, have a positive sign.
This suggests that the absolute contribution increases with earnings. When combined
with our previous results on the impact of earnings on the contribution rate presented
in Table 5, our analysis suggests that, even though the absolute contribution increases
with earnings, the increase in the absolute contribution is less than proportionate to the
increase of earnings. As a result, the contribution rate falls.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
To summarize, we thus have the following result:
Result 1 The egalitarian treatment results in a higher absolute contribution and a higher
contribution rate than the meritocratic treatment.
Next, we specically focus on the behavior of the low and high scoring allocators across
treatments. Table 7 presents the results of a series of OLS regressions on this matter.
Models 1 and 2 are the OLS regressions for the high scoring allocators. The independent
variable in model 1 is the contribution rate, while the independent variable in model 2 is
the absolute contribution. DumHighTreat is a dummy variable that takes the value of
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1 for the egalitarian treatment and 0 for the meritocratic treatment. It can be observed
that this dummy variable is not statistically signicant in both models. This conrms our
earlier result showing that the high scoring allocators do not really change their giving
behavior when moving from the meritocratic treatment to the egalitarian treatment.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
Models 3 and 4 are the OLS regressions for the low scoring allocators. The independent
variable in model 3 is the contribution rate, while the independent variable in model 4 is
the absolute contribution. DumLowTreat is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
for the egalitarian treatment and 0 for the meritocratic treatment. We can see now that
the behavior of the low scoring allocators across treatments is markedly di¤erent from
that of the high scoring allocators. The coe¢ cients for the dummy variable are highly
statistically signicant at the 1% signicance level and have a negative sign. This implies
that the low scoring allocators increase their absolute contribution and their contribution
rate when moving from the meritocratic treatment to the egalitarian treatment.
To sum up, we have the following result:
Result 2 (i) Despite being taxed in the egalitarian treatment, the high scoring allocators
do not become less generous in the egalitarian treatment than in the meritocratic treatment.
(ii) The low scoring allocators, who are subsidized by the high scoring allocators, are more
generous in the egalitarian treatment than in the meritocratic treatment.
Overall, our analysis shows that an egalitarian institutional setting generates stronger
other regarding behavior than a meritocratic institutional setting. This stronger other
regarding behavior is mainly shown by the low performers. It suggests that being at
the receiving end of a kind act themselves encourages the low performers to reciprocate
forward the generous act of the high performers to the third-party recipients. In essence, a
generously egalitarian environment inculcates a pay-it-forward attitude. Boulding (1981),
and later Moody (2008), formally coined the term serial reciprocity to refer to this kind
of generous attitude. This notion of reciprocity is di¤erent from the standard notion
of reciprocity found in the literature,4 which usually refers to quid-pro-quo exchanges
4See, for instance, Rabin (1993), Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2003).
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between two parties. One party bestows a kind act on another party, and in exchange
the latter feels obliged to pay it back to the rst party. In the forward reciprocity case,
instead of paying it back to the rst party, the second party pays it forward to a third
party.
Interestingly, the high performersgenerosity was not adversely a¤ected by the fact
that in the egalitarian setting they are in e¤ect being taxed. Our results also clearly
demonstrate the endogeneity of social preferences. In particular, social preferences are
shaped by the surrounding institutional setting governing the procedure by which income
is redistributed among individuals.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated the e¤ect of an endowment allocation procedure on social prefer-
ences using a two-stage dictator game. In the rst stage, participants who were randomly
selected as allocators had to perform a task of answering GRE- and GMAT-like questions
to earn money. Better performance on the task resulted in higher earnings. From the rst
stage, we obtained the distribution of the allocatorsscores (performance) on the task.
We then provided the allocators with information on their individual ranking of scores
among all allocators and the general distribution of scores.
Prior to conducting the second stage, the allocators initial money endowment was
determined. In our baseline meritocratic treatment, the allocatorsinitial money endow-
ment was set equal to their individual earnings from the task. In another treatment,
which we called the egalitarian treatment, the allocatorsinitial endowment was set equal
to the average earnings of all allocators from the task. This implies that in the egalitarian
treatment, the high performers were taxed, while the low performers were given subsidy
by the high performers.
In the second stage, the allocators had to decide how much of their money endowment
to give to other participants who were randomly designated as the recipients.
Our experimental results showed that the allocators were more generous under the
egalitarian treatment than under the meritocratic treatment. Thus, in essence, the egal-
itarian treatment gave rise to stronger other regarding behavior among the allocators.
Surprisingly, being taxed and forcedto subsidize the low performers did not diminish
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the high performersgenerosity. We showed that the contribution rate and the absolute
contribution of the high performers in the egalitarian treatment were not statistically
di¤erent from the contribution rate and the absolute contribution of the high performers
in the meritocratic treatment.
However, the low performers who were at the receiving end of a kind actof the high
performers signicantly increased their contribution rate and absolute contribution given
to the third-party recipients in the egalitarian treatment. Essentially, the generously
egalitarian environment inculcates a pay-it-forward attitude. The low performers may
have felt obliged to reciprocate for what they had received from the high performers
by being more generous toward the third-party recipients. Boulding (1973) and Moody
(2008) refer to this form of reciprocity as serial reciprocity.
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Appendix
Data
Meritocratic
Treatment
Egalitarian
Treatment
No. of allocators 36 36
No. of recipients 36 36
TOTAL 72 72
Gender of
allocators
Males 16 16
Females 20 20
Scores
Mean 10.0000 10.1667
Std. dev. 5.0596 3.2470
Max 19 18
75% 14 12
Median 10.5 10.5
25% 6 8.5
Min 0 4
Earnings
Mean 13.0000 13.0000
Std. dev. 5.0596 0.0000
Max 22 13
75% 17 13
Median 13.5 13
25% 9 13
Min 3 13
Contribution
amount as
proportion of
money
endowment
Mean 0.0855 0.1536
Std. dev. 0.1221 0.1662
Max 0.5000 0.5400
75% 0.1300 0.2700
Median 0 0.0800
25% 0 0
Min 0 0
Table 1: Summary of the Descriptive Statistics
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Statistical tests
Meritocratic vs. Egalitarian
Treatments
1. Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.6150
2. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 0.9774
Note: Numbers in the above cells denote the p-values.
Table 2: Statistical Tests on the AllocatorsScores
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Figure 2: The Histograms of the Contribution Rates
Meritocratic treatment Egalitarian treatment
Mean Median Std. Dev
No.
Obs.
Mean Median Std. Dev.
No.
Obs.
Contribution rate
All 0.0856 0.0000 0.1221 36 0.1536 0.0800 0.1662 36
High 0.0806 0.0250 0.1038 18 0.1111 0.0800 0.1506 18
Low 0.0906 0.0000 0.1410 18 0.1961 0.1500 0.1743 18
Table 3: The Descriptive Statistics of the Contribution Rate
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Figure 3: The Histograms of the Contribution Rate for the Low and High Scorers across
Treatments
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Egalitarian treatment
All High scorers Low scorers
Meritocratic treatment All 0.0574*
High scorers 0.6039
Low scorers 0.0335**
Note:
1. Numbers in the above cells denote the p-values obtained from the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test.
2. * indicates significance at the 10% level.
3. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table 4: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test for the Equality of Means
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OLS Regressions (with Robust Standard Errors)
Dep. Variable: the contribution rate
Independent variables
Models
1 2 3 4 5 6
Earnings -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.021
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Gender 0.0041 0.0261 0.0447 0.0261
1 if male (0.0353) (0.0566) (0.0360) (0.0570)
0 if female
Dumtreat -0.0681* -0.0681* -0.0840** -0.0681* -0.0681* -0.0846**
1 if Meritocratic treatment (0.0344) (0.0342) (0.0410) (0.0346) (0.0344) (0.0411)
0 if Egalitarian treatment
Dumtreat x Gender 0.0359 0.0373
(0.0710) (0.0724)
Constant 0.1536*** 0.1340*** 0.1420*** 0.1752** 0.1592** 0.1691**
(0.0277) (0.0316) (0.0370) (0.0759) (0.0728) (0.0800)
N 72 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.0530 0.075 0.0786 0.0546 0.0771 0.0811
Note:
· Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
· * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
Table 5: OLS Regressions with the Contribution Rate as the Dependent Variable
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OLS Regressions (with Robust Standard Errors)
Dep. Variable: the absolute amount of transfer
Independent variables
Models
1 2 3 4 5
Earnings 0.1060* 0.1021* 0.1004*
(0.0543) (0.0054) (0.0511)
Gender 0.6250 0.5906 0.3375
1 if male (0.4532) (0.4424) (0.7475)
0 if female
Dumtreat -0.9444** -0.9444** -0.9444** -0.9444** -1.1699**
1 if Meritocratic treatment (0.4418) (0.4386) (0.4357) (0.4331) (0.5299)
0 if Egalitarian treatment
Dumtreat x Gender
Constant 2.0000*** 0.1722*** 0.6217 0.4106*** 0.5452
(0.3630) (0.4116) (0.7954) (0.8147) (0.8246)
N 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.0613 0.0878 0.0997 0.1234 0.1277
Note:
· Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
· * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
Table 6: OLS Regressions with the Absolute Contribution as the Dependent Variable
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OLS Regressions (with Robust Standard Errors)
Independent variables
Models
High Scorers Low Scorers
Dep. Variable: Dep. Variable:
CR
1
AC
2
CR
3
AC
4
Earnings 0.0101 0.3081** -0.0141 -0.0348
(0.0096) (0.1625) (0.0561) (0.0720)
Gender 0.0755 1.0728** -0.0067 -0.1602
1 if male (0.0453) (0.6321) (0.0561) (0.6447)
0 if female
DumHighTreat 0.0761 1.3263
1 if high scorers & egalitarian (0.0571) (0.8313)
0 if high scorers & meritocratic
DumLowTreat 0.1640* 2.0410*
1 if low scorers & egalitarian (0.0596) (0.6793)
0 if low scorers & meritocratic
Constant -0.1295 -4.3644 0.2186 1.0386
(0.1595) (2.6753) (0.1395) (0.8162)
N 36 36 36 36
R2 0.1391 0.1990 0.1396 0.2412
Note:
· CR=contribution rate and AC=absolute contribution
· Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
· * indicates significance at the 1% level and ** indicates significance at the 10% level.
Table 7: OLS Regressions with the Contribution Rate of the Low and High Scorers as the
Dependent Variables
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